As problems ofviolence and crime become more prevalent in our schools (or at least the perception oftheir prevalence), more and more school districts will elect to use security technologies to control these problems. While the desired change in student and community attitudes will require significant systemic change through intense U.S. social programs, security technologies can greatly augment school staffy by providing services similar to having extra adults present Technologies such as cameras, sensors, drug detection, biometric and personnel identification, lighting, barriers, weapon and explosives detection, anti-graffiti methods, and duress alarms can all be effective, given they are used in appropriate applications, with realistic expectations and an understanding oflimitations. Similar to a high-risk government facility, schools must consider a systems ("big picture") approach to security, which includes the use ofpersonnel and procedures as well as security technologies, such that the synergy created by all these elements together contributes more to the general "order maintenance" ofthe facility than could be achieved by separate measures not integrated or related.
The obvious solution is to provide for many more adults at the schools. Unfortunately, the cost of manpower (or of training/liability in the case ofvolunteers), can be impractical. And schools are learning what business and government facilities realized two decades ago: humans do not do mundane tasks well, manpower costs are always increasing, manpower turnover can make training costs skyrocket, and humans cannot always be trusted, which is totally unacceptable in a school environment. Hence the possible role of security technologies. Through technology, a school can introduce ways to collect information or enforce procedures or rules that they would not be able to afford (or rely on) adults to do. Technologies that can be considered for application in schools include cameras, sensors, drug detectors, breathalyzers, biometric and personnel identifiers, physical barriers, weapon and explosives detectors, and duress alanns.
The role of order maintenance
One additional consideration that cannot be overlooked is the perception of chaos on a school campus. If a school is perceived as unsafe, then "undesirables" will come in and the school will become unsafe. It is the "Broken Window Theory" on a much larger scale. It is, unfortunately, a negative synergy that allows seemingly insignificant incidents or issues to combine to provide the groundwork (or even just the reputation) of a problem school. This is why issues of vandalism and theft can be almost as harmful at a school as actual violence --they can create a breeding environment for the violence. Therefore, issues contributing to an overall "order maintenance" must be taken seriously. Reducing theft, deterring vandalism and graffiti, keeping outsiders offcampus, keeping the facility in good repair, getting rid oftrash, and improving poor lighting are all paramount to a school. Technologies such as cameras, sensors, microdots (for identifying ownership), anti-graffiti methods, and biometric or other personnel identification techniques can contribute significantly in many school situations (but not all!), and should be considered as possible approaches to "order maintenance".
Why security technologies have not been embraced by schools in the past Anyone working in the security market is aware that there are literally thousands ofproducts on the market, each claiming to be the "very best of its kind". And, unfortunately, there are a significant number of customers in the country who have been less than pleased with the ultimate cost, maintenance requirements, effectiveness, and operability of security technologies they have purchased. In the past, schools have quite often fallen into the category ofunsatisfied customers, in that they are usually driven by finances to purchase the "lowest-bid" hardware and installation. Without becoming security experts themselves, it can be quite difficult for school administrators to always invest security dollars in the most appropriate ways.
At the same time, the application ofthese technologies must be cost-effective, maintainable, practical, and socially acceptable. Anyone can make a school secure using many impressive state-of-the-art technologies, given unlimited dollars, ifthere are no concerns ofprivacy, and no concerns exist about the impression that the school is some sort of prison. However, dollars ARE always limited, privacy IS a big deal, and few communities are going to accept a prison-like school for their youth. The issues come down then to applying security technologies where practical, effective, and acceptable. This is not a straightforward task.
A systematic approach to identifying the risks at a school In the past, schools have rarely had the time or resources to consider their security plan from a .systemsperspective --looking at the big picture ofwhat they are trying to accomplish. Like any other type offacility, a school must understand WHAT it is trying to protect (its assets), WHO they are trying to protect against (the threats), and the general environment and operating constraints that they must work within (the characterization ofthe facility). (And this information may change from year to year, depending on the community and other factors.) Only then can any facility do an adequatejob of pulling together a systematic approach to security, which will involve some combination oftechnologies, personnel, and procedures, and do the best possible job of solving its problems within its financial constraints.
[I would like to mention at this point that I have had the privilege ofleading site surveys at a few ofthe nation's most highrisk facilities for the purpose ofevaluating and making recommendations for security upgrades. However, I spent NO MORE TIME AND EFFORT in working with most ofthese facilities than I have in our recent work with a local high school. It is my observation that schools have a more difficult securityjob in some ways than many business or govermnent facilities; their assets (kids) are large in number and enormously valuable, their potential threats (some ofthese same kids plus everyone else in the neighborhood) are uncountable, and their environment, which must be truly pristine in safety and security, must be open to the community. But school security budgets are low and their accountability to the public is high. THIS is a hardjob! Now, this doesn't mean it costs as much to protect a school as it does a high-security facility, but it does require as much thought and careful planning.} Characterizing a school 's environment: Is the school new or old? Does everyone who ever worked at the school still have keys? Are gangs a problem in the area and do they bother kids at the school? Are the school grounds open and accessible to anyone or do fences or buildings restrict access? Are there many hiding places in the halls or classrooms? What is the nighttime lighting like? Is the school small enough so that most ofthe staffknow most ofthe students and parents? What is the crime rate in the neighborhood? Does the sensor system work well or do the local police ignore the alarms due to a high false-alarm rate? Is the school administration well-liked by the students? Are teachers allowed access at night? Are students allowed off campus at lunch time? How many incidents of violence occurred at the school over the last three years? Are visitors forced to go through the front office before accessing the rest of the school? What is the "in" dress?
How much does the athletic program influence the rest ofthe student body? Are your most vocal parents pro-security or pro-privacy?
Defining a school 's assets: For this school, and this school year, what is most at risk? Are the instruments in the band hall a very attractive target for theft or vandalism? Is the new computer lab fall ofthe best and most sellable PCs? Of course, the protection ofthe students and staff is always at the top ofthe list, but the measures taken to protect them are driven by the defined threats.
Defining a school's threats: For this school year, who is your school threatened by? Gang rivalries? Violence behind the gym? Drugs hidden in lockers? Guns brought to school? Outsiders on campus? Drinking at lunch time? Vehicle breakins? Graffiti in the bathrooms? Accidents in the parking lot? How sophisticated (knowledgeable oftheir task of malevolence) or motivated (willing to risk being caught or risk being injured) do the perpetrators seem to be? Measures taken to protect against these threats are driven by the characterization ofthe environment (the neighborhood) and the facility.
Through a good understanding ofall ofthe constraints that your security plan must work within, and what potential threats and vulnerabilities are of most concern at the present time, the most necessary and effective security measures can be identified. If resulting designs (e.g., fencing, sensors, locker searches, speed bumps) are too costly or are unpalatable to the community, a school then has thejustification for modification ofthe facility and facility constraints (e.g., back entrances locked from the outside, no open campus, no teacher access after 10:00 p.m., no lockers, etc.).
Designing the school security system After identifying the vulnerabilities or concerns at most facilities, a systems approach to the security plan would then examine possible solutions to each vulnerability from the perspective of Detection > Delay > Response
For any problem, it is necessary first to detect that an incident is occurring. For example, when someone is breaking into a building, it is necessary that this act be detected and that information be supplied to the authorities as soon as possible. Next, this adversary must be delayed as long as possible so that the response force may arrive (e.g., make it difficult for him to take stolen computers away from the facility quickly). One simple example would be to firmly attach (such as with bolts) computer components onto the large, heavy desks they sit on, so that a thiefis forced to waste a lot oftime to remove them. Lastly, someone must respond to the incident, such as the police force, to attempt to catch the thief.
For a school environment, it is probably appropriate to expand this model:
The most appealing step in any school security system would be to convince the perpetrator that he shouldn't do whatever it is he is considering doing, whether it is perceived as too difficult, or not worth his while, or the chances ofbeing caught are quite high. Unlike other facilities, where a perpetrator would be handed over to the authorities to deal with, a school often has the authority and/or opportunity to set the consequences for some incidents that occur on their campus. Indeed, these consequences can oftentimes be the deterrence needed to prevent many incidents. If a school made any student caught with alcohol on campus ALWAYS pull weeds on the athletic field for two Saturday mornings, students may be deterred from this particular act in the future.
To illustrate the application of this model, if one of the major concerns that the students have at their school is the alarming frequency with which cars are being broken into in the student parking lot, a model for the security system to address this concern might be:
Deterrence Obviously, this model is not appropriate for all aspects of security, but it serves as an excellent start when considering each problem or concern.
Evaluating a school's security-system design
In facilities with more resources, it is a reasonable exercise to run computer models to examine the effectiveness of most proposed security systems, especially those involving many layers of security, including both technologies and people. For a school, however, this is probably not reasonable. The next best thing to determine the effectiveness of a proposed security upgrade would be to get the opinions of as many appropriate parties as possible. Present the problem and then ask for comments on the proposed solution from the teachers, the student council, the parent advisory group, the local police, and other schools in the area. Making these groups a part ofthe security upgrade team also ensures buy-in and gets the word around that the school is taking active security measures (deterrence!).
The New Mexico School Security and Anti-Violence Program -PILOT Sandia National Laboratories, funded by the Department ofEnergy's Education Outreach Program, and in partnership with the New Mexico Department ofEducation, Safe and Drug-Free Schools, the New Mexico Citizen's Crime Council, and the local Public Service Company, began a pilot project in January of 1996 as the beginning ofthe New Mexico School Security and Anti-Violence Program. The pilot school was Belen High School in Belen, New Mexico, about 30 miles south of Albuquerque. This school was chosen because it was viewed as a typical New Mexico school with average problems, because of the community support for such an endeavor, and because of its proximity to Sandia Labs.
The examination and analysis ofBelen High School required very close interaction with and much work by the school principal, Ron Marquez, and the district superintendent, Michael Grossman. This analysis took approximately 100 hours of meetings and interactions over a four-month period. At the end ofthis analysis, a community meeting was held that included school administrators and school board members, the local police chief, the local sherifi two district juvemle judges, the juvenile probation officer, the local state government representatives, city council members, the local newspaper, and a few teachers, students, and parents. Buy-in from this group was received for the general concept of ideas being considered for implementation at Belen High School. Reasonable concerns regarding privacy issues were discussed and resolved. Over the next month, eight classes were taught to eight different groups of interested students at Belen High School on various topics in security technologies, including sensors, cameras, and metal detectors.
By the sixth month ofthe project, all ofthe responsible parties had agreed to the set of security upgrades described below. The majority ofthis system was installed during the summer months and implemented when the students came back to school in September, 1996. The hardware portion of this effort cost approximately $42,000.
Based on the vulnerabilities that Belen High School felt were of primary importance (which will not be listed here by request of the school), the following measures were included in the security upgrade to address six areas of concern:
Violence . Provide a hand-held metal detector to the school for the rare occasions when a student needed to be searched or when there was news that a special event might involve weapons being brought to a school function.
. Install video cameras (vandal-resistant) in areas ofconcem on the campus. So far, we have had luck with the use ofthe "Silent Witness" camera. . Install "black boxes" (similar to those used on school buses) in classrooms where requested by teachers. When a teacher is having a problem with a particular student(s), insert a camera at that teacher's request the night before and set to record during the problem times. . Issue picture IDs to all students and staff provide "fading" 8-hour temporary badges to the school to issue to all visitors on campus; post a security aide at the single campus vehicle entrance to check student IDs to get onto campus; require student IDs for students to attend athletic functions for free. . Prohibit students from going to their cars during lunch time. Prohibit students from leaving athletic functions and then returning.
Theft/Vandalism . Upgrade sensors in school buildings and classrooms, including wireless infrared sensors, glass-break sensors, and boundary-penetration sensors, especially in areas with large amounts of assets. . Mark all attractive assets (e.g., computers, band instruments, hand tools, shop equipment, VCRs, etc.) in three different ways: (1) using indelible ink and stencils, mark "Belen High School" on all major surfaces, (2) hide "microdots" within equipment where possible to help identify stolen equipment which has had other markings removed, and (3) etch "Belen High School" on metal and hard plastic surfaces with an Air Scribe (by Chicago Pneumatic) which can still be identified even ifthe surface is sanded off. . Install vandal-resistant cameras in the student parking area. Prohibit students from going to their cars during lunch time. Fencing will be installed by the school district next year. We have recommended an 8' chain-link with a small 1-1/4" mesh that deters easy climbing.
, Provide anti-graffiti sealer paints for those bathrooms that are usually hardest hit by graffiti.
Drugs/Alcohol . Provide hair-analysis test kits for the detection of drugs to parents at their request. Results are provided only to the parents, who may then come to the school for help if desired. . Provide a portable "breathalyzer kit" to the school for use in special situations. . "Sniff' air vapor throughout the school using a new preconcentrator invented at Sandia Labs that is connected to an ion mobility spectrometer for the detection of drugs.
. Support the school in its decision to close the campus at lunch time and not allow students to go to their cars.
Safety
, Upgrade the parking lot lighting to improve safety for night-school attendees and evening athletic events. . Install a fire alarm pull box in the cafeteria hallway which sounds a local alarm when the outside cover is opened, before the actual fire alarm system is pulled.
• Support the school in its decision to install speed humps every 50 feet along the main school road Student and Teacher Buy-in • Teach classes on security technologies to the Belen High School students.
• Present in-service workshops to the teachers to update them and gather feedback.
• Hire a Belen student to do some of the tasks and act as go-between with the student council.
Consequences
. Provide support where needed to enable the school district and community to develop and enforce stronger consequences.
Early feedback
As ofthe writing ofthis document, the response to the security system upgrades has been extremely favorable. At the first parent/teacher group meeting ofthe new school year, a group of about 50 parents expressed their support for the new system, citing several anecdotes and incidents where their kids had already been influenced/affected by the system in a positive way. Break-ins in the student parking lot were averaging about five a week during the previous school year; this school year has had only three automobile break-ins during the first two months. (And that was without the camera system being operable yet, although the students did not know this.) Fights on campus, which averaged one to two a week the previous spring, were down to two for the first two months ofthe new school year. Several procedural changes seemed to have positive effects: the previous year, the hallways had been full of students skipping classes and wandering around. These students now have to show their student ID to campus security aides when challenged, and are then escorted to a study hail made to be more boring than class, and the hallways are now empty of students during class time.
Metrics will be gathered over the next two years at Belen High School to determine the long-term effects ofthe security system. While the early results would lead one to the assumption that the systems approach to school security is an excellent deterrent to many school problems, it must be realized that the security system is still in its "honeymoon period", and it will be very interesting to see if its deterrence effects last.
Lessons learned
(1) Every school, every year, is different. The different assets, threats, and environments of each school mandate that there is no single right way to do security in schools, and that the design ofa school's security system will always be somewhat subjective until very detailed expert systems are created in the future. (2) After working with a lot of schools, it appears that the more risks you have at a school, the bigger price you are probably going to have to pay in terms of sacrificing personal rights and privacy to establish an acceptable level of security. Likewise, a school experiencing fewer problems is going to be able to enjoy more privacy to maintain that same level of security. The good news is that technologies can make this loss-of-privacy "more private". A person going through a student's pockets is probably a lot less palatable than a student going through a metal-detector portal. (3) While most schools will identify the threat ofweapons on campus as a major concern, very few ofthem are willing to commit to a realistic weapon-prevention program. Most ofthe measures necessaiy for such a program are extremely unpalatable and usually do not portray a desirable school image. Most schools will have to rely on the "order maintenance" and the deterrence provided by their security system. (4) The work with Belen High School took us about 50% longer than we thought it would; schools needjust about as much careful planning and coordination as some high-risk facilities. (5) A school should tl3T to minimize adopting technologies that require a great deal of expertise from an on-site expert; that expert will leave someday and oftentimes it is difficult to find someone else motivated enough to take over the responsibility. (6) Include the local police department or response force in any security planning; they are critical to the school's goals. (7) Small things can sometimes have the most far-reaching impact. Our use of ID cards seemed to have the biggest impact on the students and adults at Belen High School, yet from our analysis and models, the ID cards appeared less significant. (8) It is SO much easier to design security into a school BEFORE it is built; a good design can greatly reduce the need for security technologies. (9) Cameras in schools can be a really big deal to some people. A school should consult with its attorney before proceeding with a security approach that involves cameras, so that it will be well understood up-front what the limitations are.
Future work
At this time, Sandia National Labs is seeking funding from several federal agencies in order to create a series of handbooks for school administrators that would provide simple-to-use information on the various types of security technologies commercially available. These handbooks would include information regarding general costs for equipment purchase and upkeep, life span ofthe equipment, maintenance requirements, operational requirements, vulnerabilities, human-factor issues, and the most effective applications. It is also planned to include prescriptive information that a school administrator could use when going out for bid to potential vendors, rather than using "lists". For example, a request for bid for installing sensors in classrooms might require that " . . . the sensor system must alarm within one second of an intruder entering through any exterior or interior windows, through any classroom doors, or through any false-ceiling tiles . . .", ratherthan a "list" that calls for " . . . a motion sensor to be installed in each classroom . . .", whichallows too wide an interpretation by potential bidders.
Conclusion
At the rate security problems have been increasing in U.S. schools over the last 15 years, it is hard to imagine that public schools will be able to afford the liability they may incur in another few years. Schools will have to be more proactive in adopting the same precautions that any business adopts today in order to remain solvent. Security technologies can be a cost-effective and viable option for schools when applied systematically and appropriately, with the buy-in of all concerned parties.
